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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, 
drawing special attention to its interactions with credit booms. A probit estimation of 
financial vulnerability episodes – identified by jumps of the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans, is run for a sample of 159 countries dividing in two sub-samples 
according to their level of development: 80 advanced or emerging economies and 79 
less developed countries. The results show that: i) credit information sharing reduces
financial fragility for both groups of countries; ii) for less developed countries, the 
main effect is the direct effect (reduction of NPL ratio once credit boom is controlled), 
suggesting a portfolio quality effect; iii) for advanced and emerging countries, credit 
information sharing (IS) also mitigates the detrimental impact of credit boom on fi-
nancial fragility, iv) the depth of IS has an negative impact on the likelihood of credit 
booms (but not the coverage of IS).
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“Sur quoi la fondera-t-il l’économie du monde qu’il veut 
gouverner? Sera-ce sur le caprice de chaque particulier? Quelle 
confusion! Sera-ce sur la justice? Il l’ignore.” 
Pascal
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1. Introduction 
 
Global financial crisis has shown the vulnerability of financial systems. It has consequently 
stressed the need for improving the management of financial vulnerability. A large literature has 
investigated this issue, mainly in the case of advanced and emerging countries. Several factors have been 
advanced as tools to reduce financial fragility. For instance, since the onset of the financial crisis, we 
observe a rapid expansion of macroprudential policies to complement existing tools to reduce both risk-
taking of individual financial institution and interdependence between them (Cerutti et al., 2016). Early 
empirical studies indicate that these measures had a relatively good efficiency in curbing housing price 
growths, bank leverage and credit growth (Claessens, 2014). However it is not clear that this new set of 
tools is appropriate to manage financial fragility in all countries, particularly in less advanced countries. 
Other tools can be more effective in these countries.  
In this paper, we concentrate on credit information sharing. Credit information sharing has been 
not developed to stabilize banking systems but rather to favor credit access for opaque firms and 
households through the provision of information on borrowers that reduce information asymmetries. 
Such mechanisms tend to be particularly effective in low-income countries (Djankov et al., 2007). Recent 
works have highlighted that the development of credit information sharing strengthens financial 
systems. The theoretical literature has explored three channels by which credit information sharing 
reduces banking fragility. First, information sharing can reduce moral hazard and enhance the borrowers’ 
incentives to repay. Borrowers repay their loans because they know that defaulters will be blacklisted, 
reducing external finance in future (Klein, 1992; Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). 
Furthermore, mitigation of the hold-up problem allowed by information sharing reduces interest rates, 
increasing entrepreneurs’ incentives to exert effort and therefore reducing moral hazard (Padilla and 
Pagano, 1997). Second, credit information sharing reduces adverse selection by improving bank’s 
information on credit applicants (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Third, credit information sharing reduces 
the risk of over-borrowing as individual lenders can access information on the overall indebtedness of 
borrowers from all lending sources (Bennardo et al., 2014). Empirical papers show that credit 
information sharing is beneficial for stability at the microeconomic level. Information sharing reduces 
credit risk (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002) and default rates (Powell et al. 2004; Houston et al., 2010). While 
credit information sharing reduces individual risks of defaults, it has ambiguous effects at the macro-
level due to composition effect (Brown et al., 2009). Credit information sharing may lead to greater 
access to credit for riskier borrowers and banks’ portfolio quality can be reduced. Recent empirical 
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evidence, Houston et al. (2010) and Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) document that greater 
information sharing leads to a reduced likelihood of financial crisis.  
In this paper, we revisit the relationship between credit information sharing and financial 
stability by investigating the complex interaction between credit information sharing, credit boom and 
financial fragility. A large literature has shown that excessive credit booms are one of the main drivers of 
financial crises. Many empirical works have shown that credit growth increases the probability of 
banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Gourinchas and Ostfeld, 2012). Recent studies have confirmed this 
fact using long-run data (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Aikman et al., 2015). 
However, a credit boom does not necessarily induce a financial crisis. A credit boom may reflect an 
improvement in investment opportunities (Aghion et al., 1999) and some episodes of strong credit 
growth correspond to a catch-up phenomenon (Gourinchas et al., 2001). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), using 
data for 170 countries over the period 1970-2010, show that only one in three credit boom episodes are 
followed by a crisis. They also point out that larger and longer is a boom, the more likely that it ends up 
badly. Recent discussions in academic and policy circles focus on the causes and consequences of credit 
booms.  
While credit information sharing may directly affect financial stability through its impact on 
portfolio quality, it can also attenuate the negative effect of credit booms and/or limit the occurrence of 
such booms (cf. dash lines in Figure 1). First, credit information sharing can mitigate the negative effect 
of credit booms. A rapid growth of credits can weaken the quality of credit screening. During credit 
booms, credit officers cannot devote sufficient time to correctly screen new projects and bad projects 
have a higher probability to be financed. The presence of efficient credit information sharing institutions 
could attenuate the negative effect of credit booms on screening. In addition, credit booms often fuel a 
rapid rise in asset prices (real estate and equity bubbles). Since assets may be used as collateral, the 
price rise will itself help an acceleration of credit growth (“financial accelerator”) and reinforcing the 
deterioration of screening. The presence of information sharing mechanisms may allow banks to 
diversify their portfolio. This diversification can limit the increase of assets prices induced by rapid credit 
growth, and therefore limit the detrimental impact of such episodes. Second, credit information sharing 
might affect the occurrence of credit booms, even if its effect is theoretically unknown. On the one hand, 
information sharing may curb credit growth by avoiding that some customers borrow from several 
banks. On the other hand, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) show that a reduction in the information 
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asymmetries across banks may lead to an easing of lending standards and, in turn, an increase in the 
volume of lending (lending boom).  
The goal of this paper is threefold: i) to evaluate the impact of credit information sharing (IS) on 
financial fragility considering a large range of countries; ii) to identify channels through which IS, if so, 
impacts financial fragility; and, iii) to distinguish whether less developed countries differ from other 
countries (advanced and emerging). Banks in less developed countries operate in a context of 
institutional failures and high degree of opacity. Sharing information about borrowers could help them 
to cherry pick the best clients and avoid extending loans to bad borrowers. Djankov et al. (2007) have 
highlighted that credit information sharing is a strong determinant of private credit to GDP in low-
income countries; we may expect that credit information sharing is also crucial for financial stability in 
these countries. In addition, we could expect that channels by which credit information sharing act differ 
across countries.  
To doing so, we combine bank-level and country-level databases to build our dataset. The 
sample used covers 159 countries including 79 developing countries and 80 emerging and developed 
countries over the period 2008-2014. We identify all episodes of financial fragility (every time non-
performing loans ratio jumps) even if the episode is not ending as a banking crisis and study the 
determinants of such episodes using a random-effect probit model. The development of IS is assessed by 
the depth index and the coverage of PCRs and PCBs. In a second step, we analyze the impact of credit 
information sharing (IS) on credit booms to disentangle indirect effects. The main results are the 
following: i) IS reduces financial fragility in both developed and developing countries, ii) for developing 
countries, the main effect is the direct effect (reduction of NPL ratio once credit boom is controlled); iii) 
for developed and emerging countries, IS also mitigates the positive effect of credit boom on financial 
fragility, iv) the depth of IS has an negative impact on the likelihood of credit booms (but not the 
coverage of IS). 
This paper provides three main contributions on the literature on the impact of credit 
information sharing on financial stability. First, our paper includes a large number of countries. Secondly, 
we analyze the direct and indirect potential effects of information sharing institutions. Finally, we 
document that credit information sharing is beneficial for both less developed and advanced economies. 
However, we show that channels slightly differ between both groups of countries. We highlight that 
credit information sharing mitigates the detrimental effect of credit booms for advanced and emerging 
countries, while its effect is more direct for less developed countries. 
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This paper also adds to the literature on the determinants of financial (in)stability. On the one 
hand, this work integrates most low-income countries. The financial stability issue in low-income 
countries has received less attention in the recent years, insofar as they have been less impacted by the 
global financial crisis than emerging and advanced economies. The question of whether less developed 
economies are more vulnerable to financial crises than emerging and high income economies is 
ambiguous. Financial vulnerability depends on the balance between risk exposure and the capacity to 
deal with these risks. However, a better understanding of financial fragility mechanisms in LICs is crucial. 
First, financial vulnerability does exist. The experience of low-income countries shows that they could 
suffer sharp increases in non-performing loans and banking crises (see Leaven and Valencia, 2013). 
Second, the cost of banking crises is high in LICs (both in terms of fiscal cost and output cost, see Laeven 
and Valencia, 2013), even if the banking sector is small. Third, the current dynamics of financial 
development in many LICs will, in parallel with its beneficial effects on access to financial services, 
increase the risk of financial instability, unless financial regulation is progressively adapted to this 
evolution. New risks arise from the increase in the relative size of the financial sector, from the 
diversification of financial products and from the deepening of domestic and international financial 
integration. On the other hand, we propose a new measure of financial instability that identifies all 
episodes of financial fragility even if the episode is not ending as a banking crisis. The end of the NPL 
episode may be either a banking crisis (including bankruptcies and/or a restructuration of the banking 
system, or “only” a phase of write off of bad loans and a recapitalization of banks having suffered 
significant losses. In both cases, is frequently observed a credit fall after the NPL cycle. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and variables and 
Section 3 develops the empirical methodology. Section 4 displays the results of our estimations and the 
final section concludes. 
2. Data and variables 
 
2.1. Data 
To identify the effect of IS on financial fragility and its transmission channels; we combine bank-
level and country-level databases. Bank-level data are used to compute the measure of financial fragility 
and were retrieved from the Bankscope database. Other variables are extracted from diverse country-
level databases including the World Development Indicators, the International Financial Statistics and 
Doing Business. Our dataset restricts to the period 2008-2014 because data on information sharing is not 
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available before 2006 and all explanatory variables are lagged. We consider all countries for which 
variables are available. To study whether developing countries differ from other countries, we 
distinguish two groups of countries: countries whose GNI per capita is below US$ 4,125 in 2014 (79, 
called developing countries)2 and countries whose GNI per capita exceeds US$ 4,125 (80, called 
developed and emerging countries). The Table A1 presents the list of countries. 
2.2. Financial fragility 
A critical step consists on selecting a good measure of financial fragility. In this work, we focus on 
country-level analysis. Overall banking system instability is often measured by systemic banking distress, 
defined as periods where the banking system is not capable of fulfilling its functions. We do not adopt 
the same perspective in our paper for two major reasons. On the one hand, banking crises in developing 
countries are rare events in recent years.3 On the other hand, a banking crisis is an extreme situation. 
Our aim is to have an indicator reflecting the fragility of financial system before the occurrence of a crisis 
rather than detecting crisis episodes. Indeed, the dynamics of NPLs has significant effects on the 
dynamics of credit even when a banking crisis is avoided, since it will dampen both credit supply (credit 
channel) and demand (Pool et al., 2015). We therefore refer to assets quality by using information on 
non-performing loans (NPLs) as a warning indicator of banking system fragility.4  
We detect episodes of financial fragility by scrutinizing annual changes of the ratio of NPLs to 
gross loans. The experience of developing countries shows that financial systems are able to withstand 
for a long time moderate levels of NPLs without undergoing crisis if bank capital structure (larger interest 
margins, higher equity ratios) is consistent with this level of NPLs (Brock and Suarez, 2000, Beck and 
Hesse, 2009). However, financial stability is threatened by a rapid increase in NPLs, which does not allow 
the financial structure to adapt, since the latter can only evolve slowly. For instance, the peak of the ratio 
of NPLs to loans in 2009 was a signal of the banking crisis in Nigeria, albeit the level of NPLs was 
moderate in previous years. The recent global financial crisis provides another evidence of this difference 
between the level and difference of NPLs to signal fragility in banking systems.  
                                                          
2
 According to World Bank’s classification, this cutoff separates countries into two groups: (i) low-income and 
lower-middle income countries and (ii) upper-middle income and high income countries.  
3 According to Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) database, only three countries with a GDP per capita below US$ 4,125 
have experienced a banking crisis since 2005 (Mongolia, Ukraine and Nigeria). A limited occurrence of such events 
does not allow us to apply robust econometric model.  
4
 There are different bank-level indicators of financial stability used in the literature including Z-score, capital ratio, 
assets quality, or bank defaults. These indicators are less relevant than a NPL based indicator to give policy 
recommendations, since they are either less transparent and/or less linked to the lending policy (equity ratios). 
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We therefore create a dummy (called Banking Sector Distress, BSD henceforth) equals to one if 
the annual change of this ratio exceeds 3 points: 
 = 1, 
	∆    ≥ 30,				ℎ
  
Our calculations are based on individual bank data drawn from the commercially available 
BankScope database. An advantage of the Bankscope database consists on its coverage of low-income 
countries.5 Insofar as we focus our attention on banking system, we keep commercial, savings and 
cooperative banks. In addition, we use unconsolidated data when available and consolidated data if 
unconsolidated data are not available, in order not to double count subsidiaries of international banks. 
The share of NPLs to loans is computed as the sum of NPLs divided by the sum of total loans (thus is a 
weighted average of bank NPL ratio). 
2.3. Credit information sharing 
The existing literature has studied the effect of credit information sharing (IS) on financial stability. 
To study the impact of credit information sharing, a first measure often employed is a dummy indicating 
whether a private bureau or a credit registry operates in a country. While the dummy variable approach 
tests whether the existence of credit information sharing matters, it does not distinguish between the 
different information provided by and the coverage of information sharing mechanisms. To circumvent 
this limit, an index capturing the depth of information provided is computed by Doing Business. The 
index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information.6 Doing 
Business also provides the coverage of credit information sharing mechanisms. Credit bureau 
(respectively credit registry) coverage reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a credit 
bureau’s (respectively registry’s) database relative to the number of adults. We add credit bureau 
coverage and credit registry coverage to get the total coverage of information sharing. In this paper, we 
use both the depth and the coverage to proxy the development of information sharing mechanisms. 
                                                          
5
 Until recently, the coverage of banks in low-income countries by the Bankscope was limited but many 
improvements have been made during the past decade. There is one alternative database, namely the Financial 
Soundness Indicators database from the IMF. The IMF’s database considers the period from 2005 to 2014. 
However, the coverage of low-income countries is limited in this database due to filters rules applied. However, for 
remaining countries, the correlation coefficient of the ratio of NPLs to loans equals 0.75. 
6
 Since 2013, Doing Business provides an index ranging from 0 to 8 (see the Doing Business website: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/). However, to allow comparison over time, we use the former index ranging from 0 
to 6. Precise description of the index can be found in Djankov et al. (2007) or in Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012).  
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2.4. Credit booms 
In the literature different methods have been employed to detect credit booms ranging from credit 
growth to econometric filter methods (see Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). In this work, we employ a simple 
measure following the approach adopted by Gorton and Ordoñez (2016). We define a credit boom as 
starting whenever a country experiences at least three consecutive years of positive growth in credit 
over GDP that averages more than 5%. In the robustness check, we consider an alternative measure of 
credit boom. Data about credit to GDP is obtained from the WDI.  
2.5. Control variables 
We follow the existing literature to select control variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998, 2002; Beck et al., 2006; Büyükkarabacak et Valev, 2010, 2012). Variables are grouped in two 
categories: financial system and macroeconomic factors.  
Financial fragility also depends on the risk-taking by banks in their credit operations. The magnitude 
of credit risk depends on the rate of credit growth, the quality of credit screening and the diversification 
of the credit portfolio. Unlike credit growth, the quality of the credit selection and portfolio 
diversification are not readily observable. Therefore, it is useful to include in the analysis the 
characteristics of the banking system that affect the incentives for banks to take risks. We include a 
measure of the structure of banking systems. A large literature has studied the impact of bank 
competition on financial stability. The degree of bank competition has ambiguous impact on financial 
fragility. The majority of papers using country-level data and banking crisis dummy are in line with the 
competition-stability view (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Laeven and Valencia, 2013) with the 
notable exception of Beck et al. (2006). Studies using bank-level data are more ambiguous. Some studies 
considering a large sample of countries support the competition-stability view (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013), 
while other papers find the opposite (Turk-Ariss, 2010; Beck et al., 2013). We therefore include an 
indicator of concentration, namely the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, as a control variable. Controlling for 
banking system concentration also allows us to partially capture changes in terms of regulations (entry 
rules, capital regulation).7 
                                                          
7
 A large empirical literature has investigated the effect of capital regulation, restrictions on bank entry, restrictions 
on nonlending activities (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004) or deposit insurance scheme (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002; Anginer et al., 2014) on bank risk taking or financial stability. These papers use updated data on 
regulation from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) and/or deposit insurance database provided by Demirgüç-Kunt, 
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We also control for capital inflows due to their importance in financial crises in Asia or Latin 
America in the 1990s (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). We therefore control by adding the net total 
inflows to GDP as a control variable. We build this variable by adding portfolio, FDI and aid flows relative 
to GDP. In addition, we control for changes of nominal exchange rate.8  A rapid exchange rate 
depreciation raises repayment costs for foreign currency loans and could induce less repayment 
(Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). At the opposite, a rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate might 
render exporters less competitive and affect their ability to repay their loans. Exchange rate variation is 
computed as the percentage change of value of one dollar in local currency.  
Several features of the macroeconomic situation may affect borrowers’ capacity to service their 
debt. GDP growth increases borrowers' repayment capacity and should reduce the financial fragility. The 
theoretical effect of inflation is ambiguous since inflation reduces the real value of debt service but can 
also reduce the borrowers' income. Empirical literature identifies a negative impact of GDP growth on 
the likelihood of a banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) 
and on NPL ratio (Glen and Mondragon-Vélez, 2011; Klein, 2013; Beck et al. 2015). Conversely, these 
studies find a positive impact of inflation and unemployment on financial vulnerability (bank crisis 
likelihood and NPL ratio). We use as control variables the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of 
inflation. The rate of inflation is obtained by computing the annual change of Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
We expect that financial distresses are more likely in period of slow growth and high inflation. 
3. Econometric specification 
3.1. Baseline model  
Our first specification considers the net effect of information sharing on financial fragility. More 
formally, we estimate the following equation:  
( = 1) = " + $%&' + Γ)&' + *                   (1) 
where subscripts i and i refer to country and year respectively. BSD is a dummy variable equal to one 
if a country experienced a situation of financial distress (see 3.1.2) and 0 otherwise. IS is a measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Kane and Laeven (2015). The use of this variable would significantly redue the sample of developing countries, on 
which we focus. 
8
 Considering real exchange rate should be better but including real exchange rates sharply reduces our sample due 
to the lack of data. Using the nominal effective exchange rate instead of the us dollar bilateral would be a useful 
extension. 
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the development of credit information sharing mechanisms (depth index and coverage) and X is a matrix 
of control variables. We expect that $ < 0; in other words, we expect that the likelihood to experience a 
financial distress decreases with the depth and coverage of information sharing.  
3.2. Transmission channels 
In a second step of analysis, we investigate the transmission channels through which information 
sharing affects financial fragility. As expressed above, we dedicated special attention to credit booms 
(Figure 1). First, we study whether information sharing exerts an impact on financial fragility through an 
additional channel than credit booms (blue arrow in Figure 1). We therefore estimate the following 
equation:  
( = 1) = " + $%&' + ,-&' + Γ)&' + *                   (2) 
We expect that , > 0, indicating that a situation of financial distress is more likely after a credit boom; 
and $ < 0. 
Secondly, the development of information sharing can mitigate the detrimental impact of credit growth. 
We therefore extend Eq. 2 by adding an interaction between IS and CB as follows:  
( = 1) = " + $%&' + ,-&' + 0%&' ∗ -&' + Γ)&'	 + *                   (3) 
Finally, we test the impact of information sharing on credit booms. Formally, we estimate the following 
equation:  
(- = 1) = "′ + $′%&' + Γ′)&' + *            (4) 
where CB is a dummy equals to one if a country i experienced a credit boom in year t. The sign of $′ 
is theoretically unknown. The development of credit information sharing may limit the likelihood to 
observe a credit boom by avoiding that some borrowers borrow from different banks	($3 < 0). 
However, credit information sharing may increase the occurrence of credit booms by facilitating access 
to credit	($3 > 0).   
In all models, we add time dummy variables to control for common shocks (such as 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis). The specifications employ independent variables lagged by one-year to reduce 
endogeneity. At the exception of Eq. 3, we use a random-effect probit due to the binary nature of 
dependent variable and to control for unobserved country heterogeneity. For Eq. 3, we employ a linear 
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random-effect model.9 Indeed, the interpretation of interaction poses some challenges in non-linear, 
especially for random-effect probit model (Greene, 2010). 
Finally insofar as we are particularly concerned by developing countries, all equations are estimated 
not only for the sample of all countries but also separately for advanced/emerging countries (80, whose 
GNI per capita is above US$ 4,125 in 2014) and for less developed countries (79, whose GNI per capita is 
below US$ 4,125 in 2014).  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics. These statistics document that episodes of rapid 
degradation of loan quality are frequent. As documented in Figure 2, such events affect both groups of 
countries. In addition, we clearly observe the effect of the recent 2008 global financial crisis that induces 
an increase of NPLs in subsequent years. Table 1 points out that correlation coefficient between BSD and 
a (one-lagged) credit boom seems moderate; however, such correlation is not always informative due to 
the nature of variables (dummies). We scrutinize in more details this relationship. Among 133 episodes 
of rapid loan quality degradation, one third (43) are preceded by a credit boom in the previous year. It 
should be noted that similar figures are obtained by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016). This ratio reaches almost 
50% in the case of developed and emerging countries (30 out of 66 episodes) that can be explained by 
the recent financial crises. For developing countries, 20% of financial distresses were preceded by a 
credit boom (13 out of 67).  
Scrutinizing credit information sharing data, we observe that both depth and coverage of credit 
information sharing is higher in high-income countries. However, developing economies – especially 
middle-income countries - have experienced a rapid expansion of information sharing institutions during 
the last ten years. The rate of coverage of public and private institutions as well as the quality of 
information increased in middle-income countries during the last decade (see Figure A1). For instance, 
the depth index has increased from 1.4 to 3.8 in lower middle income countries and from 2.4 to 4.3 for 
upper-middle income countries. The trend is similar for the coverage of IS that has almost tripled for 
both groups of countries during the past decade. After a long period of stagnation, low-income countries 
                                                          
9
 Our robustness checks presented in the Appendix document that linear and non-linear models provide close 
results, both in terms of statistical significance and economic amplitude.  
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have experienced some improvements in recent years. The depth of IS has therefore increased from 0.3 
to 0.8 in three years (from 2012 to 2014) and the coverage has doubled during the same period. 
4.2. The net effect of credit information sharing on financial fragility   
4.2.1. Baseline results 
We start by testing whether credit information sharing development affects the occurrence of financial 
fragility episodes. Econometric results are reported in Table 2. The two first columns consider all 
countries, while columns [3] and [4] concentrate on countries whose GNI per capita exceeds US$ 4,125 
in 2014 and columns [5] and [6] on countries whose GNI per capita exceeds US$ 4,125 in 2014 (called 
“developing countries”). We consider two measures of credit information sharing: the depth of 
information provided by and the coverage of credit bureaus and credit registries. The bottom of the 
Table reports the usual tests of model validity. The LR test valid our choice to take into account 
unobserved country heterogeneity.   
The baseline model provides two main messages. First, the development of credit information sharing 
(IS) mechanisms is negatively related to financial fragility. Both the index of depth and the coverage of 
information sharing mechanisms are negatively, and statistical significant so, associated with the 
likelihood to experience a period of rapid loan quality degradation. The impact of credit information 
sharing development is not only statistical significant but the effect is also economically significant. The 
results indicate that a one-standard deviation of credit depth index reduces the likelihood to observe a 
financial crisis episode by 3.5 percentage points and a one-standard deviation of the coverage of 
information sharing by 4 percentage points. Second, credit information sharing mechanisms exert a role 
on both developed and developing countries. As documented in columns [3] to [6], the depth and the 
coverage of credit information sharing mechanisms are negatively associated with financial fragility for 
both sub-samples of countries.  
Regarding control variables, the likelihood to experience an episode of financial distress is reduced in 
countries with a higher GDP per capita, a limited size of financial system, with high growth and in 
competitive banking markets. It should be noted that some of these results hold for developed countries 
but tend to vanish when we consider only developing countries.10 
                                                          
10
 In an alternative model, we consider macroprudential policies as control variables (in all specifications). Data are 
extracted from Cerutti et al. (2016) and we employ the three alternative variables developed by the authors (Global 
index, borrowers’ targeted instruments index and financial institutions’ targeted instruments index). The sample of 
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4.2.2. Sensitivity tests 
We have established that IS development reduces financial fragility. In the next section we will explore 
transmission channels in this relationship. Before doing so, we run sensitivity analysis to be ascertaining 
that our results are not driven by misspecification. Results are reported in the Appendix (Tables A3 and 
A4). First, we exclude all control variables (columns [1]). Second, we change the econometric method. 
The baseline model uses a random-effect probit model to control for country heterogeneity. An 
alternative method is population-averaged probit model. An advantage of the population-averaged 
method is that it allows us to reduce the influence of outliers (columns [2]). Third, we also consider a 
probability linear model (random-effect model) (columns [3]). Fourth, we change our measure of 
financial distress by considering a shock of 5 percentage points instead of 3 percentage points (columns 
[4]). Two final tests of sensitivity focus on the sample considered. On the one hand, we exclude the year 
following the start of the banking system distress (columns [5]). On the other hand, we select country-
year observations where the number of banks exceeds five banks. Indeed, in some low-income 
countries, only a handful of banks operate. As a result, variation of NPLs might only capture the 
difficulties faced by one bank. We re-estimate our model on these sub-samples (columns [6]). Our 
findings are unchanged - both statistically and economically.  Finally, the development of IS may be 
influenced by the fragility of the banking sector and the assumption of exogeneity could be no longer 
valid. To limit this issue, all explanatory variables are lagged. However, we also use an instrumental 
variable approach. We follow instrumental strategy proposed by Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) 
considering the total population and urbanization rate.11 For sake of brevity, we do not report the results 
but our results confirm the negative effect of IS. Coefficients associated with IS remain negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications (all countries and both sub-samples; depth and coverage). In 
addition, our instrumentation strategy seems valid: the F-stat of the first stage estimation exceeds 10 
and instruments are exogenous according to over-identification tests (applied to linear IV estimations). 
In addition, the Wald tests of exogeneity tend to reject the presence of endogeneity. For the remainder 
of our paper, we therefore assume that IS development is exogenous.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
countries is largely reduced from 159 to 96 countries due to the lack of information. Our results can be summarized 
as follows: (i) the introduction of macroprudential policies does not alter our results regarding credit information 
sharing; (ii) coefficients associated with macroprudential policies are never statistically significant and/or robust. 
Results are available upon request.  
11
 We also test another instrument, namely the share of informal economy. The idea is that development of IS is 
lower in economies with a large share of informal activity. However, our results are not improved. It should be 
noted that our instrumentation strategy provide less clear-cut results when we consider sub-samples, even if 
coefficients associated with IS remain negative and statistically significant. Our regressions suffer from weak 
instruments and/or difficulties to converge.  
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4.3. Transmission channels 
The baseline model points out that information sharing mechanisms limit the risk to experience an 
episode of financial distress for a country. In addition, results do not differ between developing and 
developed countries. In a second step of analysis, we shed lights on transmission channels. As 
documented in Figure 1, IS might exert a role on financial fragility through at least three channels. We 
test each channel in separate models. 
4.3.1. Direct effects of credit information sharing after controlling for credit booms 
While we expect that IS affects financial fragility through credit booms, it can also have independent 
effect. To test this hypothesis, we run Eq. 2 that consists on the baseline model with an additional 
variable, namely credit boom (CB). Results are reported in Table 3. First, we document that a credit 
boom in previous years induces a higher probability to observe a financial distress, in line with previous 
studies. A credit boom increases by almost 5 percentage points the likelihood to observe a situation of 
banking distress. Interestingly, the economic impact of credit boom is higher for developing countries. 
Moreover, we document that, after controlling for credit booms, neither the sign nor the amplitude of 
marginal effects associated with the depth and coverage of IS has been dramatically affected. In other 
words, IS exerts an impact on financial fragility through other channels than credit booms. When we 
focus on sub-samples of developed and developing countries, our results are largely unchanged. We run 
the same battery of sensitivity analysis than those presented in section 4.2. In addition, we consider an 
alternative definition of credit booms (an average of 3% instead of 5%). Our main results are not altered 
by these different changes. These findings document that IS act directly on financial fragility by 
improving the portfolio quality  
4.3.2. Interaction between credit information sharing and credit booms 
Information sharing may also reduce financial fragility by mitigating the detrimental effect of 
credit booms. To test this channel, we add an interaction between IS and credit booms as expressed in 
Eq. 3. Contrary to previous specifications, we run a probability linear model because the signs of 
interactions cannot be easily computed in a non-linear model, especially for random-effect probit 
models (Greene, 2010). A linear model allows us to directly get the impact of interaction by observing 
the sign and significance of coefficient. Results are reported in Table 4. The two first columns report 
econometric results for the sample of all countries. We observe that not only variables related to the 
development of IS enter significantly and negatively, but their interactions with credit booms also enter 
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negatively and are statistically different from zero. The impact of credit information sharing is not only 
statistically significant but also economically meaningful. A credit boom increases the likelihood of 
experiencing an episode of banking distress by 30 percentage points in a country without information 
sharing. However the effect of a credit boom is reduced by 10 percentage points in a country having a 
moderately developed credit information sharing mechanisms (i.e. IS whose level of development equals 
the average, namely the depth index of 3 and coverage of 32%). Put differently, information sharing 
exerts a direct impact on financial fragility but also mitigates the detrimental effect of credit booms.  
In a second step, we divide our sample between advanced/emerging and developing countries. 
Information provided are instructive. For countries whose GNI exceeds US$ 4,125, the positive effect of 
IS on financial stability tend to be related to their role during credit booms. Indeed, we observe that 
variables of IS in levels do not remain statistically significant, albeit interactions are. On the contrary, for 
developing countries, variables in level remain negative and statistically significant, but interactions 
between credit booms and IS are not different from zero. Even if we ignore statistical significance, the 
economic size of interaction is reduced for developing countries. To sum up, the development of IS 
seems to mitigate the negative impact of credit booms; however, this mitigation effect is driven by 
developed and emerging economies.  
4.3.3. Determinants of credit booms 
The previous sub-section has documented that IS play a different role in developed and developing 
countries. While IS seems to mitigate credit booms in developed and emerging countries, its effects pass 
through another channel in developing countries. To complete our analysis, we shed lights on the impact 
of IS on the likelihood to observe a credit boom. We test this potential hypothesis by investigating the 
determinants of a credit boom (Eq. 4). Table 5 reports the determinants of credit booms. The results are 
interesting: the depth of credit information sharing tends to reduce the likelihood to observe a credit 
boom. This result occurs in the different specifications (all countries, developed and developing sub-
samples). The results indicate that a one-standard deviation of credit depth index reduces the likelihood 
to observe a credit boom by 1.5 percentage points. This result is far from anecdotal insofar as the 
likelihood to observe a credit boom equals 20%. As previously, the impact of the quality of credit 
information sharing is higher for developed countries (reduction by 3.5 pp.). At the opposite, the 
coverage of credit information sharing has not statistical impact on the occurrence of credit booms.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of credit information sharing on financial vulnerability on a large 
sample of countries. Instead of banking crisis dummy, we consider an alternative measure of financial 
fragility based on changes in the ratio of NPLs to loans to capture all episodes of financial distress and 
not only the extreme ones. Our first result confirms findings from other papers by highlighting the 
stabilizing impact of credit information sharing. We also document that this result hold for both less 
developed countries (whose GNI per capita is below US$ 4,125) and other countries (advanced and 
emerging). In a second step, we study the complex relationships between credit information sharing, 
credit booms and financial fragility. Our econometric results point out several important results: (i) 
information sharing development has a direct effect, after controlling for credit booms; (ii) higher the 
scope of information collected, lower the likelihood to observe a credit boom is (but the coverage of 
credit information sharing information does not matter); (iii) credit information sharing mitigates the 
detrimental effect of credit boom but this result holds only for advanced and emerging countries; and 
(iv) credit booms are strong predictors of financial vulnerability, especially in  advanced and emerging 
countries.  
Our results, although preliminary, have several policy implications. First, the credit growth is a key 
variable to conduct macroprudential policies in low and middle-income countries. Second, current 
efforts to develop credit information sharing schemes should be strengthened, since the latter allow a 
credit expansion without excessive increase in the overall credit risk. Our results also document that 
credit information sharing has little.impact on credit booms in developing countries, which justifies the 
extension of other tools – such as macroprudential policies - to prevent excessive credit growth. At last, 
extending the coverage of information sharing systems is not enough, since depth of information sharing 
is more efficient to avoid credit booms. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Information sharing, credit booms and financial fragility 
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Figure 2: Banking system distress and (lagged) credit booms, by year and group of countries 
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Table 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Bank  Credit  Info   Info   ln(GDPpc) PC/GDP inflation Growth Capital   Exchange  HHI 
  distress booms Depth Cover.         flows rate (var.)   
Obs 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 
Mean  0.14 0.20 2.89 32.708 8.25 54.003 6.3448 3.6773 0.1093 0.0171 973.52 
Std. Dev 0.34 0.31 2.47 36.873 1.58 44.720 8.3941 4.3482 0.3506 0.0904 2041.04 
Min 0 0 0 0 4.9980 0.2959 -30.613 -15.088 -2.2683 -0.1847 0.7242 
Max 1 1 6 100 11.363 253.45 103.82 25.049 4.9607 0.6759 10000 
 Correlations 
BSD 1.00 
 Credit 
boom 0.20 1.00 
 Info depth -0.16 0.03 1 
 Info 
coverage -0.15 0.03 0.76 1.00 
 ln(GDPpc) -0.06 0.17 0.54 0.55 1.00 
 PC/GDP 0.00 0.29 0.39 0.41 0.69 1.00 
 inflation 0.06 -0.05 -0.16 -0.18 -0.29 -0.29 1.00 
 Growth -0.09 -0.06 -0.20 -0.23 -0.33 -0.31 0.23 1.00 
 Capital 
flows 0.00 0.04 -0.14 -0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.03 1.00 
 Exch. Rate 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 -0.10 0.30 -0.19 -0.02 1.00 
 HHI 0.17 -0.07 -0.38 -0.29 -0.18 -0.19 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
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Table 2: Baseline model  
  All countries   GNI per capita > US$ 4,125   GNI per capita ≤ US$ 4,125 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0149*** 
  
-0.0094** 
  
-0.0225** 
 
 
(-2.75) 
  
(-2.07) 
  
(-2.43) 
 Coverage of IS -0.0011*** 
  
-0.0006** 
  
-0.0020** 
  
(-2.70) 
  
(-2.07) 
  
(-2.04) 
Ln(GDPpc) -0.0219* -0.0229** 
 
-0.0498*** -0.0476*** 
 
0.0265 0.0200 
 
(-1.89) (-2.00) 
 
(-3.01) (-2.95) 
 
(0.97) (0.74) 
PC/GDP 0.0008** 0.0009** 
 
0.0007** 0.0007*** 
 
0.0006 0.0004 
 
(2.32) (2.49) 
 
(2.57) (2.69) 
 
(0.64) (0.43) 
Inflation -0.0000 -0.0001 
 
-0.0025** -0.0024** 
 
0.0025 0.0025 
 
(-0.01) (-0.05) 
 
(-1.99) (-1.99) 
 
(1.53) (1.52) 
Growth -0.0052** -0.0051** 
 
-0.0032 -0.0028 
 
-0.0061 -0.0065 
 
(-2.23) (-2.19) 
 
(-1.58) (-1.44) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.54) 
Capital  -0.0073 -0.0048 
 
-0.0024 -0.0011 
 
0.0103 0.0039 
 
(-0.21) (-0.14) 
 
(-0.09) (-0.04) 
 
(0.08) (0.03) 
Exch. Rate 0.0623 0.0659 
 
0.0122 0.0177 
 
0.2452 0.2478 
 
(0.61) (0.65) 
 
(0.14) (0.21) 
 
(1.31) (1.32) 
HHI 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(2.23) (2.62) 
 
(0.35) (0.70) 
 
(2.59) (2.73) 
         # Obs. 977 977 
 
499 499 
 
478 478 
# countries 159 159 
 
80 80 
 
79 79 
Pseudo R² 0.08 0.08 
 
0.12 0.12 
 
0.09 0.08 
LR test (rho=0) 38.42*** 37.17*** 
 
34.97*** 35.59*** 
 
1.84* 1.74* 
Wald test 50.16*** 49.83***   29.56*** 29.20***   32.96*** 31.81*** 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a financial distress in year t. All explanatory variables 
are includes with one-year lag. Year dummies are included but not reported. Random effect probit model is used. LR statistic test 
the relevance of random effects (rho). Under the null hypothesis, random-effect probit model and pooled probit model provide 
similar results. Wald test tests the significance of all explanatory variables. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients 
and z-stats are in brackets.  *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 3: Extended model (including credit booms) 
  All countries   GNI per capita > US$ 4,125   GNI per capita ≤ US$ 4,125 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0132** 
  
-0.0096* 
  
-0.0197** 
 
 
(-2.47) 
  
(-1.95) 
  
(-2.19) 
 Coverage of IS -0.0009** 
  
-0.0005* 
  
-0.0018* 
  
(-2.29) 
  
(-1.83) 
  
(-1.88) 
CB 0.1073*** 0.1054*** 0.0468** 0.0442** 
 
0.1721*** 0.1719*** 
 
(-4.16) (-4.08) 
 
(-2.49) (-2.37) 
 
(-3.04) (-3.12) 
         Control 
variables Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
         
         # Obs. 977 977 
 
499 499 
 
478 478 
# countries 159 159 
 
80 80 
 
79 79 
Pseudo R² 0.09 0.09 
 
0.12 0.12 
 
0.10 0.09 
LR test (rho=0) 29.73*** 28.91*** 
 
28.15*** 28.03*** 
 
1.36 1.41 
Wald test 65.43*** 64.93***   35.56*** 35.40***   40.14*** 39.41*** 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a financial distress in year t. All explanatory 
variables are includes with one-year lag. Control variable and year dummies are included but not reported. Random effect 
probit model is used.   LR statistic test the relevance of random effect. Under the null hypothesis, random-effect probit model 
and pooled probit model provide similar results. Wald test tests the significance of all explanatory variables. Marginal effects 
are reported instead of coefficients and z-stats are in brackets. *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Interactions between information sharing and credit booms 
  All countries   GNI per capita > US$ 4,125   GNI per capita ≤ US$ 4,125 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0114* 
  
-0.0149 
  
-0.0183** 
 
 
(-1.86) 
  
(-1.42) 
  
(-2.40) 
 Depth of IS*CB -0.0374* 
  
-0.0528* 
  
-0.0111 
 
 
(-1.64) 
  
(-1.80) 
  
(-0.35) 
 Coverage of IS 
 
-0.0006* 
  
-0.0067 
  
-0.00128* 
  
(-1.76) 
  
(-1.52) 
  
(-1.95) 
Coverage of 
IS*CB 
 
-0.0034*** 
 
-0.0035*** 
 
-0.0036 
  
(-2.79) 
  
(-2.58) 
  
(-1.06) 
CB 0.307*** 0.310*** 
 
0.345*** 0.307*** 
 
0.249* 0.305** 
 
(3.30) (4.37) 
 
(2.90) (3.45) 
 
(1.82) (2.30) 
         Control variables Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
         # Obs. 977 977 
 
499 499 
 
478 478 
# countries 159 159 
 
80 80 
 
79 79 
R² (overall) 0.11 0.12 
 
0.17 0.17 
 
0.11 0.11 
Wald test 74.71*** 74.69*** 
 
66.11*** 64.62*** 
 
82.64*** 85.14*** 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a financial distress in year t. All explanatory 
variables are includes with one-year lag. Year dummies are included but not reported. Linear random effect model is used. 
Wald test tests the significance of all explanatory variables. *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Determinants of credit booms 
  All countries   GNI per capita > US$ 4,125   GNI per capita ≤ US$ 4,125 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0051* 
  
-0.0146*** 
 
-0.0019* 
 
 
(-1.88) 
  
(-2.61) 
  
(-1.75) 
 Coverage of IS 
 
-0.0002 
  
-0.0005 
  
0.0000 
  
(-1.09) 
  
(-1.40) 
  
(0.22) 
Ln(GDPpc) 0.0054 0.0041 
 
-0.0195 -0.192 
 
0.0078* 0.0053 
 
(0.95) (0.71) 
 
(-1.21) (-1.15) 
 
(1.86) (1.22) 
PC/GDP 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0003*** 0.0003** 
 
(4.18) (4.23) 
 
(4.32) (4.21) 
 
(2.60) (2.52) 
Inflation 0.0000 0.0001 
 
0.0010 0.0012 
 
-0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.03) (0.06) 
 
(0.57) (0.70) 
 
(-0.66) (-0.58) 
Growth 0.0020 0.0022* 
 
0.0032 0.0038 
 
-0.0002 -0.0000 
 
(1.57) (1.64) 
 
(0.98) (1.14) 
 
(-0.36) (-0.05) 
Capital  -0.0032 -0.0019 
 
-0.0022 0.0010 
 
0.0220 0.0245 
 
(-0.27) (-0.16) 
 
(-0.11) (0.05) 
 
(0.95) (1.00) 
Exch. Rate -0.0248 -0.0299 
 
-0.0385 -0.0534 
 
-0.0211 -0.0293 
 
(-0.35) (-0.43) 
 
(-0.27) (-0.38) 
 
(-0.68) (-0.83) 
HHI -0.00001* -0.00001 
 
-0.00001* -0.00001 
 
-0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(-1.86) (-1.43) 
 
(-1.84) (-1.41) 
 
(-0.99) (-0.82) 
         # Obs. 1083 1083 
 
555 555 
 
528 528 
# countries 159 159 
 
80 80 
 
79 79 
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.12 
 
0.18 0.18 
 
0.07 0.06 
LR test (rho=0) 29.51*** 28.63*** 
 
5.57*** 7.34*** 
 
18.06*** 16.04*** 
Wald test 72.63*** 70.72*** 
 
56.89*** 52.35*** 
 
22.55*** 20.73*** 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a credit boom in year t. All explanatory variables are 
includes with one-year lag. Year dummies are included but not reported. Random effect probit model is used. LR statistic test 
the relevance of random effect. Under the null hypothesis, random-effect probit model and pooled probit model provide 
similar results. Wald test tests the significance of all explanatory variables. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients 
and z-stats are in brackets.  *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
 
  
26 
 
Appendix (only for referee)  
Figure A1: Evolution of depth and coverage of information sharing, by groups of countries 
(a) Depth    
 
(b) Coverage 
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Table A1: List of countries 
Countries whose GNI exceeds US$ 4,125   Countries whose GNI is below US$ 4,125 
Antigua and Barbuda 
 
Latvia 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Jordan 
Argentina 
 
Lebanon 
 
Albania 
 
Kenya 
Australia 
 
Libya 
 
Algeria 
 
Kosovo 
Austria 
 
Lithuania 
 
Angola 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Bahamas 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Armenia 
 
Lao PDR 
Bahrain 
 
Malaysia 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Lesotho 
Belarus 
 
Maldives 
 
Bangladesh 
 
Liberia 
Belgium 
 
Malta 
 
Benin 
 
Macedonia, FYR 
Botswana 
 
Mauritius 
 
Bolivia 
 
Madagascar 
Brazil 
 
Mexico 
 
Bosnia and Herz. 
 
Malawi 
Brunei Darussalam 
 
Montenegro 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
Mali 
Bulgaria 
 
Namibia 
 
Burundi 
 
Mauritania 
Canada 
 
Netherlands 
 
Cabo Verde 
 
Moldova 
Chile 
 
New Zealand 
 
Cambodia 
 
Mongolia 
Colombia 
 
Oman 
 
Cameroon 
 
Morocco 
Costa Rica 
 
Panama 
 
Central African Rep. 
 
Mozambique 
Croatia 
 
Papua New Guinea 
 
Chad 
 
Nepal 
Cyprus 
 
Poland 
 
China 
 
Nicaragua 
Czech Republic 
 
Portugal 
 
Comoros 
 
Niger 
Denmark 
 
Qatar 
 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
 
Nigeria 
Dominica 
 
Romania 
 
Congo, Rep. 
 
Pakistan 
Dominican Republic 
 
Russia 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 
 
Paraguay 
Equatorial Guinea 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Djibouti 
 
Peru 
Estonia 
 
Serbia 
 
Ecuador 
 
Philippines 
Finland 
 
Seychelles 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
 
Senegal 
France 
 
Singapore 
 
El Salvador 
 
Sierra Leone 
Gabon 
 
Slovak Republic 
 
Ethiopia 
 
Sri Lanka 
Germany 
 
Slovenia 
 
Gambia, The 
 
Sudan 
Greece 
 
South Africa 
 
Georgia 
 
Swaziland 
Grenada 
 
Spain 
 
Ghana 
 
Tajikistan 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
 
Sweden 
 
Guatemala 
 
Tanzania 
Hungary 
 
Switzerland 
 
Guinea 
 
Thailand 
Iceland 
 
Syria 
 
Guinea-Bissau 
 
Togo 
Ireland 
 
Tunisia 
 
Guyana 
 
Tonga 
Israel 
 
Turkey 
 
Haiti 
 
Uganda 
Italy 
 
United Arab Emirates 
 
Honduras 
 
Ukraine 
Japan 
 
United Kingdom 
 
India 
 
Vietnam 
Kazakhstan 
 
United States 
 
Indonesia 
 
Yemen, Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
 
Uruguay 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
 
Zambia 
Kuwait   Venezuela, RB   Iraq     
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Table A2: Variables – Definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
BSD Dummy equals to 1 if the ratio of NPLs to loans increases by more than 5 points in one year Bankscope 
Credit boom Dummy equals to one if a country experienced a credit boom (see Section 3.1.4 for complete definition) WDI  
Info_coverage Coverage of information sharing mechanisms Doing Business 
Info_depth Depth of information provided by the credit information sharing mechanism (ranging from 0 to 6) Doing Business 
PC/GDP Credit to the private sector / GDP WDI 
Growth Rate of growth of real GDP WDI  
Inflation Percentage change in the CPI WDI  
Capital inflows (Equity inflows+FDI inflows + Bilateral aid inflows)/GDP WDI  
∆(Exchange rate) Annual variation of exchange rate (in percent) IFS 
GDPpc Real GDP per capita WDI  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of concentration in banking sector Bankscope 
WDI: World Development Indicators; IFS: International Financial Statistics  
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Table A3: Robustness checks (Depth of information sharing) 
Panel A: All countries 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0180*** -0.0180*** -0.0195*** -0.0084** -0.0130*** -0.0063** 
 
(-3.99) (-2.67) (-2.58) (-2.51) (-2.59) (-2.09) 
       Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       # Obs. 1,000 977 977 977 852 705 
# Countries 161 159 159 159 159 114 
Lecture des colonnes  
      
       Panel B: Countries whose GNI exceeds US$ 4,125 in 2014 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0148*** -0.0203** -0.0292** -0.0054* -0.0100** -0.0050** 
 
(-2.73) (-2.21) (-1.99) (-1.74) (-2.33) (2.26) 
       Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       # Obs. 515 499 499 499 439 421 
# Countries 91 80 80 80 80 67 
       
       
       Panel C: Countries whose GNI is below US$ 4,125 in 2014  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Depth of IS -0.0219*** -0.0230** -0.0221*** -0.0117** -0.0224** -0.0158** 
 
(-2.74) (-2.46) (-2.71) (-2.30) (-2.48) (-2.23) 
       Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       # Obs. 485 478 478 478 413 284 
# Countries 80 79 79 79 79 47 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a financial distress in year t. All explanatory 
variables are includes with one-year lag and year dummies are included but not reported. Random effect probit model is used 
at the exception of columns [2] (population-averaged probit model) and [3] linear model. In column [4], the dependent variable 
is an alternative measure of financial distress. In columns [5] and [6], sub-samples are considered. Marginal effects are reported 
and z-stat are in brackets. For more details, see Section 4.1.2.  *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table A4: Robustness checks (Coverage of information sharing) 
Panel A: All countries 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Coverage of IS -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0005** -0.0010*** -0.0005** 
 
(-3.52) (2.59) (-2.60) (-1.96) (-2.73) (-2.30) 
       Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       # Obs. 1,000 977 977 977 852 705 
# Countries 161 159 159 159 159 114 
       
       Panel B: Countries whose GNI exceeds US$ 4,125 in 2014 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Coverage of IS -0.0009** -0.0011** -0.0013** -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0003** 
 
(-2.51) (-2.01) (-2.32) (-1.36) (-2.25) (-2.52) 
       Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       # Obs. 515 499 499 499 439 421 
# Countries 91 80 80 80 80 67 
              
                     
Panel C: Countries whose GNI is below US$ 4,125 in 2014  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Coverage of IS -0.0021** -0.0021** -0.0017** -0.0009* -0.0021** -0.0013* 
 
(-2.24) (-2.06) (-2.17) (-1.66) (-2.11) (-1.77) 
       
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 
485 478 478 478 413 284 
  80 79 79 79 79 47 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a country experienced a financial distress in year t. All explanatory 
variables are includes with one-year lag and year dummies are included but not reported. Random effect probit model is used 
at the exception of columns [2] (population-averaged probit model) and [3] linear model. In column [4], the dependent variable 
is an alternative measure of financial distress. In columns [5] and [6], sub-samples are considered. Marginal effects are reported 
and z-stat are in brackets. For more details, see Section 4.1.2.  *, **, and *** indicates significance level of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. 
“Sur quoi la fondera-t-il l’économie du monde 
qu’il veut gouverner? Sera-ce sur le caprice de 
chaque particulier? Quelle confusion! Sera-ce 
sur la justice? Il l’ignore.” 
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